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I. INTRODUCTION
TN A RECENT case governed by the Warsaw Convention,'
I the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals specifically held that a
passenger's intent has no bearing in establishing final desti-
nation for purposes of determining appropriate jurisdiction
under the Warsaw Convention.2 This holding is significant
because final destination is one of the available fora in
which one may bring a suit governed by the Warsaw Con-
vention. Perhaps most significant is that the holding was
an express rejection of a New York district court decision to
Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Trans-
portation by Air, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, T.S. No. 876, 137
L.T.N.S. 11, reprinted in 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1988) (as amended) (adherence of the
United States proclaimed Oct. 29, 1934) [hereinafter Warsaw Convention].
2 Swaminathan v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 962 F.2d 387, 389 (5th Cir. 1992).
3 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28(1). Much of the text in this comment
is dedicated to examining this very point.
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the exact contrary.4 While not exactly a circuit split, these
two decisions have set the stage for dispute. To date, the
Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of whether a
passenger's intent has any effect on the determination of
final destination for Warsaw Convention jurisdiction pur-
poses, precisely the issue this comment will address.,
The Warsaw Convention only applies to international
travel on an air carrier for hire.6 Further, the Warsaw Con-
vention specifically provides four possible judicial fora, one
of which is a court at the place of destination.7 In many
cases involving round trip travel, courts have treated the
place of origin of the trip as being the same as the destina-
tion for purposes of the Warsaw Convention." While seem-
ingly a simple matter, determining a given passenger's
destination can be quite complex.91ndeed, there are nu-
In re Air Crash Disaster Near Warsaw, Poland, on May 9, 1987, 760 F. Supp. 30,
32 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
1 Whether the holdings of the two cases mentioned above, even if both were cir-
cuit court decisions, constitute a sufficient basis for Supreme Court review due to a
circuit split is beyond the scope of this article.
6 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
7Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28(1).
8 See In reAir Crash Disaster Near Cove Neck, N.Y., on Jan. 25, 1990, 774 F. Supp.
732, 739-42 (E.D.N.Y. 1991); Butz v. British Airways, 421 F. Supp. 127, 130-131 (E.D.
Pa. 1976).
9 An example may demonstrate some of the complexities of determining destina-
tion. A young German national and his wife are living in France; he is attending the
Sorbonne while his wife is working to cover living expenses. The couple intends to
return to Germany after the husband completes his education, and both desire to
retain their German citizenship.
One spring, the husband learns that his father will donate the old family Merce-
des to the young couple if they will pick it up. The young man decides that during
spring break they will fly to Hamburg, Germany (his family's domicile), pick up the
car, and then drive to Munich to attend a friend's wedding. Since the wife cannot
get much time off from work, she will fly back to France after the wedding; the
husband intends to drive to the Alps to do some climbing and then drive to their
apartment in France.
Originally, the husband thought he would buy a one way ticket for himself since
he was going to drive the car back, and a round trip ticket for his wife. The round
trip for his wife was for a flight from France to Hamburg, with the return flight to
France leaving from Munich instead of Hamburg (the wife was going to ride in the
car from Hamburg to Munich). Because of the airline pricing schemes then in
place, a round trip fare turned out to be much cheaper than a one way fare. So, in
order to save money, the husband bought a round trip ticket. In fact, he bought a
round trip ticket identical to that of his wife's (a round trip ticket from France to
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merous situations in which destination may be difficult to
determine.10
This comment will analyze jurisdiction under the Warsaw
Convention as it is determined by destination. First, a brief
history of the Convention will be presented because under-
standing the purpose of the Convention is paramount to
analyzing its jurisdictional provisions. Next, the issues aris-
ing under analysis of jurisdiction will be presented. A dis-
cussion of the definition of "destination" follows, noting the
various circumstances under which questions arise. And, fi-
nally, this comment will focus on whether the passenger's
intent has, or should have, any impact on the determina-
Hamburg to France would have been a few dollars cheaper, but because of the car's
high milage, there was no guarantee it would make it to France, so the husband
bought the round trip ticket thinking there was no harm in having a back-up plan
that included traveling with his wife).
Suppose the flight carrying the couple from France to Hamburg crashed just
short of Hamburg. Both the husband and the wife would have an interest in bring-
ing any suits they may have in Germany, since they are German nationals. Germany
also has an interest in maintaining the suits within its borders in order to protect
German citizens. Assume also that the German procedural and liability laws are
more favorable than those in France.
As noted above, final destination is one of the prescribed fora in which an individ-
ual may bring a suit governed by the Warsaw Convention. Assuming the flight is
governed by the Warsaw Convention, and ignoring all of the other possible bases for
jurisdiction, the foregoing scenario presents several interesting dilemmas. First,
since the husband did not intend to use the return portion of his ticket (he only
bought a round trip because it was cheaper), he might argue that Hamburg, Ger-
many was his final destination, thus establishing proper jurisdiction in Germany.
This would require a subjective analysis of passenger intent, and in the above de-
tailed scenario, the fact that the return portion of the ticket may be viewed as a back-
up provision would necessarily cloud the analysis.
Secondly, the wife might argue that Germany was her final destination because
she in fact had two final destinations. The first destination was Hamburg and the
Second was France because she was not traveling by air for her entire journey, mak-
ing only the two separate legs by air, with the intervening leg by car. Her intent
becomes problematic when looking to determine if she viewed her travel as one
undivided arrangement for travel, or as several different travel arrangements.
A number of cases have addressed the issues of round trip tickets bought for their
reduced fare, when there was no intent on the passenger's part to use the entire
ticket, and travel involving breaks in the air transportation portions of the trip, such
as long layovers or triangular routes with mixed modes of transportation. These
cases, along with other situations giving rise to problems in determining final desti-
nation, are discussed in detail below in sections III and IV.
10 See infra notes 135-175 and accompanying text.
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tion of destination, and hence, jurisdiction under the War-
saw Convention.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE WARSAW
CONVENTION 1
The Warsaw Convention is the product of two interna-
tional conferences. The first conference, which took place
in Paris, established an interim committee that developed
the body of the convention that was finalized at the second
conference held in Warsaw, Poland in 1929.12 The United
States became a party to the Warsaw Convention by merely
adhering it,'3 although the United States was not directly
involved in the Convention's formulation. 14
The United States later gave notice of denunciation of
the Convention in 1965.15 While denunciation of the Con-
vention was withdrawn prior to its taking effect in 1966,16
the fact that there was a denunciation at all illustrates the
United States' dissatisfaction with some of the terms of the
Warsaw Convention that go to the heart of the Conven-
tion's purposes, as well as some of the jurisdictional terms
that are the subject of this comment. 17
i' For an excellent and detailed description of the Warsaw Convention and its
history, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld & Allan I. Mendelsohn, The United States and the
Warsaw Convention, 80 Hxav. L. RE.v. 497 (1967).
12 Id. at 498. The fact that the conference finalizing the convention was held in
Warsaw is what gave rise to the title of the Convention.
1S Id. at 502. The Warsaw Convention provides that once the Convention has
come into force, any state may adhere to it. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art.
38(1). The Warsaw Convention further describes the process by which new signato-
ries are to adhere. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 38(2), (3).
14 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 11, at 502.
15 Id. at 497. The Warsaw Convention provides that any contracting party may
denounce the convention "by a notification addressed to the Government of the
Republic of Poland, which shall at once inform the Government of each of the High
Contracting Parties." Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 39(1). Such denuncia-
tions take effect six months after the notification. Id. art. 39(2).
16 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 11, at 497.
17 The United States was almost immediately at odds with the low liability limits
that were set in the Warsaw Convention. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 11,
at 502-04. This disagreement has lead to several amendments to the Convention
and an agreement between air carriers that do business in the United States. For a
brief discussion of these issues see infra note 40 and the sources cited therein.
662 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
A. SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS
The Warsaw Convention only applies to international
travel of passengers and international shipments of goods
or baggage by air,'8 performed for hire, or gratuitously, by
an "air transportation enterprise."19 The Convention also
applies to state-owned airlines,20 but specifically excludes
transportation effected pursuant to recognized interna-
tional postal agreements. 21. International transportation, as
defined in the Warsaw Convention, is transportation such
that the places of departure and destination (of the seg-
ment of the transportation provided by an air carrier for
hire) are within the territories of two different nations that
are parties to the Convention.22 Transportation may also
be considered international for Warsaw Convention pur-
poses if the places of departure and ultimate destination
are solely within the territory of only one party to the Con-
18 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1). "This Convention shall apply to all
international transportation of persons, baggage, or goods .... " Id.
19 Id. "[P]erformed by aircraft for hire. It shall apply equally to gratuitous trans-
portation by aircraft performed by an air transportation enterprise." Id.
20 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 2(1). "This convention shall apply to
transportation performed by the state or by legal entities constituted under public
law .... " Id.
21 Id. art. 2(2).
Id. art. 1 (2).
For the purpose of this convention the expression 'international trans-
portation' shall mean any transportation in which, according to the
contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of
destination ... are situated either within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Con-
tracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping place within a territory
subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate or authority of another
power, even though that power is not a party to this convention.
Id.
That is, a flight from Party Nation One to Party Nation Two. The nations that were
original parties to the Warsaw Convention are listed in the preamble to the conven-
tion. Id. pmbl. A list of nations with which the United States is party to bilateral
agreements governing civil transportation by air over the airspace of the signatory
countries is provided in 49 U.S.C. § 1502 (1988, 1989 Supp. 1, 1990 Supp. II, 1991
Supp. III & 1992 Supp. IV), giving the date the agreements were signed and entered
into force, as well as the appropriate citation.
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vention, if there is an agreed stopping place outside that
party's territory. 3
The qualification of a particular air travel arrangement as
international travel is not lost if there is a stopover, or
break, in the transportation; nor is it lost if there is a trans-
shipment (intervening transportation provided by non-air
carriers) .24 Furthermore, if successive carriers affect the
transportation, the situation will be deemed as one undi-
vided arrangement for transportation if the parties viewed
the arrangement as involving a single operation.2 5 This de-
termination is made regardless of whether the arrangement
involved one or a series of contracts.2 6 If there are succes-
sive carriers, or more than one contract, the transportation
is still international for Warsaw Convention purposes even
if all of the transportation provided by one carrier, or cov-
ered by one contract, is performed within one territory.27
For example, if a traveler went to a travel agent and
bought, as one undivided operation, transportation by air
from Dallas to London, the transportation would still be
classified as international travel for Warsaw Convention
23 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(2). That is, air travel from Party Na-
tion One to Party Nation Two and then Back to Party Nation One, or air travel From
Party Nation One to Nonparty Nation and back to Party Nation One.
24 Id. "[w]hether or not there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment
.... " Id.
0 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(3). "Transportation to be performed
by several successive air carriers shall be deemed, for the purposes of this conven-
tion, to be one undivided transportation, if it has been regarded by the parties as a
single operation .... " Id. Compare Railroad Salvage of Conn., Inc. v. Japan Freight
Consolidators (U.S.A.) Inc., 556 F. Supp. 124 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd 779 F.2d 38 (2d
Cir. 1985) (finding, however, that subsequent transportation provided by a non-air
carrier was not covered by the Warsaw Convention) and Arkwright-Boston Mfrs.
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Intertrans Airfreight Corp., 777 F. Supp. 103, 108-9 (D. Mass. 1991)
(same) withAbdul-Haq v. Pakistan Int'l Airlines, 420 N.Y.S.2d 848, 850 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1979) (finding that a successive motor carrier hired by the air carrier providing the
transportation would be held liable under the Warsaw Convention since it had no-
tice that the transportation was governed by the Warsaw Convention).
" Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(3). "[w]hether [the transportation by
air] has been agreed upon under the form of a single contract or of a series of
contracts .... ." Id.
27 Id. "[a] nd it shall not lose its international character merely because one con-
tract or a series of contracts is to be performed entirely within a territory subject to
the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or authority of the same High Contracting
Party." Id.
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purposes if Delta flew the traveler from Dallas to New York
City, British Airways flew him to London, and he had a dif-
ferent ticket for each carrier's portion of the trip.28 For the
Warsaw Convention to apply in this situation, however, both
the United States and the United Kingdom would have to
be parties to the Convention. 9 If, on the other hand, the
traveler bought a Dallas to London to Dallas round trip,
and the United States was a party to the Warsaw Conven-
tion, it would apply whether or not the United Kingdom
was a party. However, if the United States was not a party to
the Warsaw Convention and the United Kingdom was, the
Warsaw Convention would not apply.30
B. THE PURPOSES OF THE CONVENTION
There were two primary purposes of the Warsaw Conven-
tion. The primary goal was to limit and define the potential
liability to the airline industry.31 Facilitating travel was a re-
lated concern, as was encouraging the growth of the indus-
try. Since the industry was in its infancy, the threat of a
catastrophic accident generating huge liability was seen as a
deterrent to attracting capital. Limiting liability removed
one of the potential barriers to entry into the industry. 2
Applying the provisions of the Warsaw Convention discussed in supra notes 18-
27 and accompanying text.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1), (2) (noting the "international" re-
quirement and the requirement that both countries be High Contracting Parties).
See also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 11, at 501 (giving examples using let-
ters for parties and countries).
so Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(2) (noting the language "if there is an
agreed stopping place within a territory... even though that party is not a party to
(the] convention.");see also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 11, at 501 (giving
examples).
-' Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 11, at 499; see also Trans World Airlines,
Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp. 466 U.S. 243, 246 (1984) (same); Onyeanusi v. Pan Am.
World Airways, Inc., 952 F.2d 788, 792 (3d Cir. 1992) (same); Reed v. Wiser, 555
F.2d 1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1977) (same), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977); Husserl v.
Swiss Air Transp. Co., 388 F. Supp. 1238, 1248 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), questioned in, Eastern
Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 546-52 (1991) (limiting liability).
32 Franklin Min4 466 U.S. at 256; Pierre v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 152 F. Supp.
486, 487 (D.NJ. 1957) (facilitating air traffic); P.T. Airfast Servs., Indonesia v. Supe-
rior Court for Siskiyou County, 188 Cal. Rptr. 628, 631-32 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (en-
couraging growth of the air industry).
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The liability limitation would also make insurance more ac-
cessible and affordable. In addition, defining liability would
reduce litigation and provide more certainty as to claims,
thereby generating a benefit to both the industry and the
passenger alike.33
The second purpose of the Warsaw Convention was to
establish uniformity in the rules governing air travel be-
cause the industry was about to link countries with distinct
legal environments.3 4 This is apparent in the official title of
the Warsaw Convention-Convention for the Unification
of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation
by Air-and the unification of the rules regarding jurisdic-
tion are at the heart of this comment. The Warsaw Conven-
tion, however, has failed in terms of creating absolute
uniformity with respect to the treatment given jurisdictional
questions arising under the Convention."
1. Limit and Define Liability
Carriers are liable for damages for the death of, or injury
to, a passenger resulting from an accident that occurs on an
airplane, 36 including, by definition, accidents that occur
embarking or disembarking.3 7 Carriers are also liable for
33 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 11, at 499-500; see also Reed, 555 F.2d at
1089.
4 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 11, at 498; see also Domangue v. Eastern
Air Lines, Inc., 722 F.2d 256, 262 (5th Cir. 1984) (creating uniformity in damage
actions in international air accidents); Reed, 555 F.2d at 1083 (same); Karfunkel v.
Compagnie Nationale Air France, 427 F. Supp. 971, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (same);
Evangelinos v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 396 F. Supp. 95, 99 (W.D. Pa. 1975)
(same), rev'd & remanded, 550 F.2d 152 (3d Cir. 1977); Pierre, 152 F. Supp. at 487-88
(unifying rules); Rosman v. Trans World Airlines, 314 N.E.2d 848, 854 (N.Y. 1974)
(providing uniform rules).
See infra notes 53-198 and accompanying text.
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17. "The carrier shall be liable for dam-
age sustained in the event of death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily
injury suffered by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sustained
took place on board the aircraft... ." Id
37 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 17. "The carrier shall be liable for dam-
age sustained in the event of death or wounding of a passenger or any other bodily
injury sustained by a passenger, if the accident which caused the damage so sus-
tained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of any of the operations of
embarking or disembarking." Id.
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damage to, or loss of, checked baggage.38 Interestingly, car-
riers are even liable for damages resulting from delay.39
Aside from defining the liability of the carriers, the War-
saw Convention's largest effect is often found in the precise
articles that limit liability. Specifically, absolute maximum
amounts of liability, relating to the circumstances men-
tioned above, were set in the Convention.4 ° These exact
amounts were specified in terms of French francs, and .were
warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 18(1). "The carrier shall be liable for
damage sustained in the event of destruction or loss of, or of damage to, any
checked baggage or any goods, if the occurrence which caused the damage so sus-
tained took place during the transportation by air." Id.
-9 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 19. "The carrier shall be liable for dam-
ages occasioned by delay in the transportation by air of passengers, baggage, or
goods." Id.
40 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22. Absolute limits were set for injury or
death and carry on baggage, and an absolute limit per kilogram was set for checked
baggage. Id. art. 22(1)-(3). Disagreement on the amounts specifically set occurred
almost immediately. Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 11, at 502-04. These dis-
agreements led to numerous meetings and conferences culminating with what was
known as the Hague Conference, which resulted in amendments to the Warsaw
Convention in the form of the Hague Protocol. See id. at 502-09. The Hague Proto-
col raised the liability limits in a trade off on matters surrounding the presumption
of liability and exceptions for the carrier. Id. The United States, dissatisfied with the
liability limits as amended, never ratified the Hague Protocol. Civil Aeronautics
Board, Order of the Civil Aeronautics Board Approving Increases in Liability Limita-
tions of the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Protocol (1966) (reprinted in 49
U.S.C. § 1502 (1988)). In fact, the United States gave notice of its denunciation of
the Warsaw Convention in 1965 solely because of liability limits that were seen as too
low. Id. That denunciation was withdrawn in 1966 following an agreement that had
the effect of raising the liability limits. Id. (citing Civil Aeronautics Board Agree-
ment 18900). The agreement embodied in CAB 18900 was what is known as the
Montreal Agreement, which was not an amendment to the Warsaw Convention or a
treaty; rather, it was a contractual agreement among the world's major air carriers
exposing them to liability essentially contractual in nature. Id. See Eloise Cotugno,
Comment, No Rescue in Sight for Warsaw Plaintiffs From Either Courts or Legislature-
Montreal Protocol 3Drons in Committee, 58J. AIR L. & CoM. 745 (1993) (providing an
excellent summary of the liability limits and the United States' dissatisfaction with
them, leading to discussions of the Hague Protocol (1955), the Montreal Interim
Agreement (1966), the Guatemala Protocol (1971) and the Montreal Protocols
(1975), all addressing the liability limit issue); see also Floyd, 499 U.S. at 546-52; Mar-
ian N. Leich, The Montreal Protocols to the Warsaw Convention on International Carnage by
Air, 76 Am. J. INT'L L. 412 (1982); Jeffrey A. Cahn, Comment, Saks: A Clarification of
the Warsaw Convention Passenger Liability Standards, 16 U. Mi~mi INrrER-Am.,L. RE.v.
539, 540-43 (1985).
1994-1995] DESTINATION &JURISDICTION 667
tied to a gold standard, convertible to any national
currency.41
While the airlines received an enormous benefit under
the Warsaw Convention in the form of limitations on their
ultimate liability, passengers also received a large benefit in
the form of a presumption of the carrier's negligence. That
is, carriers are presumed negligent in the event of an acci-
dent.12 This presumption is subject to certain specific ex-
ceptions. If the carrier can show that it took all the
necessary measures to avoid damage, or that taking such
measures would be impossible or extremely impracticable,
the carrier will not be held liable.4' The carrier may also
show that the injured party was contributorily negligent and
thereby reduce its exposure to liability at least partially, if
not wholly.44
41 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 22(4). "The sums mentioned above shall
be deemed to refer to the French franc consisting of [651/2] milligrams of gold at the
standard of fineness of nine hundred thousandths. These sums may be converted
into any national currency in round figures." Id.; see also Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. at
251-53 (stating that changes in the value of gold and repeal of the official act which
set the price of gold in the United States did not change the requirement for courts
to apply the Warsaw Convention's liability limits); Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnos-
tics, Inc. v. Pan Am. World Airways, 737 F.2d 456, 457-58 (5th Cir. 1984) (determin-
ing the liability for loss is not tied to the free market price of gold), cert. denied, 469
U.S. 1186 (1985).
42 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 20. See also Franklin Mint, 466 U.S. 243
(dealing with cargo pursuant to Article 18 of the Warsaw Convention); In re Air
Crash in Bali, Indonesia on Apr. 22, 1974, 684 F.2d 1301, 1305 (9th Cir. 1982);
Dunn v. Trans World Airlines, 589 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1978); Martinez Her-
nandez v. Air France, 545 F.2d 279, 281-82 (1st Cir. 1976) (finding the Warsaw Con-
vention created strict liability), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 950 (1977); Day v. Trans World
Airlines, 393 F. Supp. 217, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Husserl, 388 F. Supp. at 1242.
43 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 20(1). "The carrier shall not be liable if
he proves that he and his agents have taken all necessary measures to avoid the
damage or that it was impossible for him or them to take such measures." Id.; see also
Air Crash at Bali, 684 F.2d at 1305 (taking all measures appropriate to the risk);
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. v. Alitalia Airlines, 429 F. Supp. 964, 967 (S.D.N.Y.
1977) (taking all measures reasonably appropriate to the risk), aff'd, 573 F.2d 1292
(2d Cir 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978); Schedlmayer v. Trans Int'l Airlines,
416 N.Y.S.2d 461, 464-65 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (same).
44 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 21. "If the carrier proves that the dam-
age was caused by or contributed to by the negligence of the injured person the
court may, in accordance with the provisions of its own law, exonerate the carrier
wholly or partly from his liability." Id.; see also Eichler v. Lufthansa German Airlines,
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2. Establish Uniformity
The second purpose of the Warsaw Convention was to
create uniformity in the laws governing international air
travel.4" The rationale behind this purpose centered
around the fact that each country that was joined by air
travel had varied laws. 46 Among the areas that uniformity
addressed in the Warsaw Convention were passenger tick-
ets, 47 baggage checks, 48 and air waybills. 49
794 F. Supp. 127, 130 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (holding that contributory negligence
reduces liability, not eliminating it); Schedmayer, 416 N.Y.S.2d at 464-65.
1- Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 11, at 498; see also supra note 34 and ac-
companying text.
Domangue, 722 F.2d at 262; Reed, 555 F.2d at 1090-91; Karfunke, 427 F. Supp. at
977; Evangelinos, 396 F. Supp. at 98-99; See Carl E. B. McKenry,Jr.,JudicialJurisdiction
Under the Warsaw Convention, 29J. AiR L. & COM. 205, 218-19 (1963) (noting that the
place of accident was originally contemplated by the drafters of the Warsaw Conven-
tion as a possible basis for jurisdiction, but that it was removed from the final ver-
sion, due, in part, to the fear that the "accident could occur at a place having a
poorly organized or underdeveloped judicial system, or none at all ... .
17 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 3.
(1) For the transportation of passengers the carrier must deliver a pas-
senger ticket which shall contain the following particulars:
(a) The place and date of issue;
(b) The place of departure and of destination;
(c) The agreed stopping places, provided that the carrier may
reserve the right to alter the stopping places in the case of ne-
cessity, and that if he exercises that right, the alteration will not
have the effect of depriving the transportation of its interna-
tional character;
(d) The name and address of the carrier or carriers;
(e) A statement that the transportation is subject to the rules
relating to liability established by this convention.
Id.; see also In reAir Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, on Mar. 14, 1980, 705 F.2d 85,
89-90 (2d Cir. 1983) (finding that eight and one half point size type on the liability
provisions of a ticket failed to give adequate notice; rather, ten point type is re-
quired); Lisi v. Alitalia-Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 370 F.2d 508, 513-14 (2d Cir.
1966) (finding that if the type size on the ticket is too small to give adequate notice
to the passenger, the liability limits of the Warsaw Convention would not apply),
aff'd, 390 U.S. 455 (1968).
48 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 4. "(1) For the transportation of bag-
gage, other than small personal objects of which the passenger takes charge of him-
self, the carrier must deliver a baggage check." Id. (stating particular requirements
for the contents of the baggage check similar to those for tickets); see also LiSi, 370
F.2d 513-14 (finding the print size on the baggage check was too small to give ade-
quate notice).
49 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, arts. 5-16 (providing similar requirements for
the particular contents of waybills in Article 8); see also Bianchi v. United Air Lines,
587 P.2d 632 (Wash. App. 1978) (addressing the requirements for waybills).
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Uniform procedures were also established. A two year
statute of limitations found its way into the convention; 50
and, plaintiffs were limited by only being able to bring suit
against the carrier who was performing the part of the
transportation involved in the accident.5 1 Further, the War-
saw Convention provided for uniform procedures in terms
of jurisdiction,52 discussed below.
III. JURISDICTION UNDER THE
WARSAW CONVENTION
Determining jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention
is a four step process. First, before the jurisdictional article
of the Warsaw Convention even comes into play, the courts
must answer the threshold question of whether the Conven-
tion applies at all.53 The Warsaw Convention only applies
to international travel by air.54 Accordingly, if the travel in-
50 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 29(1). "The right to damages shall be
extinguished if an action is not brought within 2 years, reckoned from the date of
arrival at the destination, or from the date on which the aircraft ought to have ar-
rived, or from the date on which the transportation stopped." Id. The Warsaw Con-
vention further provided that "[t]he method of calculating the period of limitation
shall be determined by the law of the court to which the case is submitted." Id. art.
29(2); see Alltransport, Inc. v. Seaboard World Airlines, 349 N.Y.S.2d 277 (N.Y. Civ.
Ct. 1973) (finding that the period of limitations did not run when the plane carry-
ing goods landed, but rather when the goods were turned over to the plaintiff (i.e.
when they were out of the control of the carrier)).
51 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 30(1), (2). Where successive carriers are
involved, each carrier is a contracting party with respect to that part of the transpor-
tation performed under his supervision, and, unless a carrier assumes liability for
the entire transportation, the passenger can only sue the carrier involved in the
accident. Id.
52 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28.
5 McKenry, supra note 46, at 205.
5 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(1), The determination of whether
travel is international for Warsaw Convention purposes is discussed at length, supra
notes 22-30 and accompanying text. For a discussion of what qualifies as interna-
tional travel, thereby bringing the transportation under the provisions of the War-
saw Convention, see Stratis v. Eastern Air Lines, 682 F.2d 406, 409-14 (2d Cir 1982)
(finding a contract for international travel had been made where a prepaid ticket
for international flight had been prepared, and the passenger could not terminate
the international portion of the flight without violating immigration rules, even
though the ticket had not been validated); Lis, 370 F.2d at 510 (noting that the
carrier conceded that the transportation was international); Ackuright-Bosto^z 777 F.
Supp. at 106-07 (noting the shipment of a machine from the United States to Ire-
land was international transportation for Warsaw Convention purposes); Rabinowitz
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volved does not fit the Convention definition of interna-
tional air travel, the Warsaw Convention does not apply.
Once a court has found that the travel is international in
nature and the Convention applies, a three step evaluation
of jurisdiction under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention
must be followed.55 First, "treaty jurisdiction" must exist
under the terms of Article 28.56 Second, the court must
have subject matter jurisdiction. 57 And third, the court
must be able to exercise personal jurisdiction over the
defendant.5"
A. TREATY JURISDICTION5 9
Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention provides four spe-
cific fora in which a plaintiff may bring an action against a
carrier.' Specifically, an action may be brought before a
court in the territory (1) of the domicile of the carrier, (2)
the carrier's principal place of business, (3) where the car-
v. Scandinavian Airlines, 741 F. Supp. 441, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding the Warsaw
Convention was applicable where a passenger's contract provided for travel originat-
ing and terminating in New York, with agreed stopping places in Copenhagen and
Moscow); Lee v. China Airlines, Ltd., 669 F. Supp. 979, 980 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (apply-
ing the Warsaw Convention to travel pursuant to round trip airline ticket from Hong
Kong to San Francisco); Karfunhel, 427 F. Supp. at 977-78 (same); Chandler v. Jet Air
Freight, Inc., 370 N.E.2d 95, 98 (I11. App. Ct. 1977) (finding transportation interna-
tional in nature by looking to the terms of the contract (ticket)).
5 See Calvin F. David & Sara Lawrence,Jurisdiction Under the Warsaw Convention and
the Death on the High Seas Act-Is there a Choice?, 53 INs. COUNS. J. 425, 426-27 (1985);
McKenry, supra note 46; Note, Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention: A Suggested Analysis,
50 MINN. L. REv. 697 (1966).
56 See infra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
57 See infra notes 88-104 and accompanying text.
M See infra notes 105-136 and accompanying text.
- There may be some confusion between treaty jurisdiction and "convention"
jurisdiction. For purposes of this comment, convention jurisdiction refers to the
finding that the transportation is international in nature, and, hence, the Warsaw
Convention applies. Treaty jurisdiction, on the other hand, refers to jurisdiction
conferred upon a court by the terms of the treaty. This should also serve to
distinguish between the three step process and the four step process mentioned
above. The first step in the four step process is the determination that the
transportation is international and the Warsaw Convention applies. The next three
steps are the same as those of the three step procedure referred to in many cases
and articles. These three steps, detailed below, address treaty, subject matter, and
personal jurisdiction as prescribed by the terms of the Warsaw Convention.
6 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28(1).
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rier has a place of business through which the contract for
transportation was made, or (4) at the place of destina-
tion.6 ' In determining treaty jurisdiction, the courts apply
their own procedural rules.62
In order for treaty jurisdiction to exist, one of the four
listed fora must be appropriate, and the burden is on the
plaintiff to make such a showing.63 Treaty jurisdiction
means that a court of a given nation is an appropriate fo-
rum for the suit.64 Territory, as used in the Warsaw Con-
vention, refers to the territory of the High Contracting
Parties.65 A determination that treaty jurisdiction exists,
merely establishes that the courts of a given nation are an
appropriate forum.6 6 In other words, the Warsaw Conven-
tion does not confer jurisdiction in specific political subdivi-
sions, and courts will apply their own internal law to
determine if venue is proper, even if treaty and subject mat-
terjurisdiction are proper.67
61 Id.
An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff,
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, either before
[1] the court of the domicile of the carrier or [2] of his principal place
of business, or [3] where he has a place of business through which the
contract has been made, or [4] before the court at the place of
destination.
Id.
I' Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28(2). "Questions of procedure shall be
governed by the law of the court to which the case is submitted." Id.; see Clark v.
United Parcel Serv., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 1209, 1211 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (finding that even
though a federal cause of action existed, local law would govern); Hill v. United Air
Lines, 550 F. Supp. 1048, 1053-54 (D. Kan. 1982); Fabiano Shoe Co. v. Alitalia Air-
lines, 380 F. Supp. 1400, 1402-03 (D. Mass. 1974).
63 Vergara v. Aeroflot "Soviet Airlines", 390 F. Supp. 1266, 1268-69 (D. Neb.
1975).
6 In reAir Disaster Near Cove Neck, N.Y., on Jan. 25, 1990, 774 F. Supp. 732, 733
(E.D.N.Y. 1991); Fabiano Shoe, 380 F. Supp. at 1402-03.
- Eck v. United Arab Airlines, 360 F.2d 804, 812-15 (2d Cir. 1966).
- Id.; Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 341 F.2d 851, 854-55 (2d Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965); Hill 550 F. Supp., at 1053; Air Crash Disaster at Cove Neck,
774 F. Supp. at 733; Pardonnet v. Flying Tiger Line, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 683, 686
(N.D. Il. 1964); Pitman v. Pan American World Airways, 223 F. Supp. 887 (E.D. Pa.
1963); Mason v. British Overseas Airways Corp., 5 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,121 (S.D.N.Y.
1956); see also Charles E. Robbins, Jurisdiction Under Article 28 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, 9 McGILL LJ. 352 (1963); Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention: A Suggested Analy-
sis, supra note 55, at 698-705.
0 Air Crash Disaster Near Cove Neck, 774 F. Supp. at 732.
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All four of the fora listed in Article 28 have been the sub-
ject of significant litigation.' Courts have focused on the
specific provisions of Article 28 to determine jurisdiction.
Numerous courts have determined that a carrier can be
domiciled in only one location. 9 They have also dismissed
cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on the
fact that the suit was not brought in the place of the car-
rier's domicile, and all other possibilities for jurisdiction
listed in Article 28 were not present.70
Similar to place of domicile, courts have determined that
carriers can only have one principal place of business.7 1 De-
termining exactly where that one principal place of busi-
ness is, however, has also been the subject of litigation.72 As
in the case of domicile, courts have dismissed cases for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction because the suit was not
brought in the principal place of business, and another ba-
sis for jurisdiction available under Article 28 was not
present.73
As noted above, a place where the carrier does business,
through which the contract for transportation was made, is
another possible basis for jurisdiction under Article 28 of
the Warsaw Convention. 4 Cases have been brought in
68 See iinfra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
69 See Air Crash Disaster Near Cove Neck, 774 F. Supp. at 722; People ex reL Compa-
gnie Nationale Air France v. Giliberto, 383 N.E.2d 977, 981 (Ill. 1978), cert. denied,
441 U.S. 932 (1979).
70 See Swaminathan v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 962 F.2d 387, 389-90 (5th Cir. 1992);
Air Crash Disaster Near Cove Neck, 774 F. Supp. at 726; Recumar, Inc. v. KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines, 608 F. Supp. 795, 798 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Hil 550 F. Supp. at 1053-54;
Butz v. British Airways, 421 F. Supp. 127, 131 (E.D. Pa. 1976); see also McKenry, supra
note 46, at 208-09 (stating that domicile is the place of incorporation and that a
carrier may only have one domicile).
11 See Air Crash Disaster Near Cove Neck, 774 F. Supp. at 722; Recumar, 608 F. Supp.
at 798; Nudo v. Sabena Belgian World Air Lines, 207 F. Supp. 191, 192 (E.D. Pa.
1962).
2 See supra note 69; see also Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 11, at 522-26.
73 Gayda v. LOT Polish Airlines, 702 F.2d 424, 425 (2d Cir. 1983) (holding that
the Warsaw Convention serves as a bar to jurisdiction for all cases falling outside its
terms); Recumar, 608 F. Supp. at 798; But, 421 F. Supp. at 131.
71 See supra note 61 and accompanying text; see also Eck, 360 F.2d at 814; Air Disas-
ter Near Cove Neck, 774 F. Supp. at 729-31; Recumar, 608 F. Supp. at 798 (noting that
the place of issue of an air waybill was an appropriate location for basing jurisdiction
on the place where the contract was made).
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courts where such contracts were not present; consequently
the cases have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. 5
But, in all of the possible bases for jurisdiction listed above,
courts have also found that an appropriate basis for subject
matter jurisdiction can exist under Article 28.76
Destination is perhaps the broadest jurisdictional basis
contained in Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention. This is
because, by definition, all international air travel, and
therefore, all travel that is subject to the provisions of the
Warsaw Convention, must have a final destination.77 Desti-
nation may be in any country that is a party to the Warsaw
Convention,78 whereas a carrier can have only one principle
place of business 79 and one domicile."0 Destination, as a
basis for jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention, is dis-
cussed below.
1. Venue v. Jurisdiction.
Courts have disagreed over whether Article 28 refers to
venue or jurisdiction.81 In Doering v. Scandinavian Airlines
75 Jamil v. Kuwait Airways Corp., 773 F. Supp. 482, 484 (D.D.C. 1991) (noting that
the plaintiff had not made any allegations as to where the contract was booked,
when arrangements for a return flight were made in Pakistan); Boyar v. Korean Air
Lines, 664 F. Supp. 1481, 1485 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air
Lines, Ltd., 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
- Proof of this can be found in the myriad cases that address issues other than
jurisdiction, such as liability limits, the statute of limitations, and the standard of
proof as evidenced by the large volume of note cases annotating the Warsaw Con-
vention in West's version of the United States Code (U.S.C.A.), as well as the Law-
yer's Cooperative's version (U.S.C.S.).
7 Article 1 of the Warsaw Convention defines international travel on the basis of
place of departure and place of destination, and, in the instance where the two are
the same, upon the locus of a stopping place that is outside the boundaries of the
place of departure and destination. Hence, travel must have a destination in order
for the Warsaw Convention to apply at all. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art.
1(2).
78 For a discussion of the classification of travel as international for Warsaw Con-
vention purposes based on the places of departure and destination being within the
territory of a contracting party, see supra note 22.
7 See supra note 70.
80 See supra note 72.
s1 David & Lawrence, supra note 55, at 426; see also D. GOEDHUIS, NATIONAL
AiRLGISLATIONS AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION 292-93 (1937). Some cases holding
that Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention prescribes jurisdiction are: Nudo, 207 F.
Supp. at 192; Winsor v. United Air Lines, 153 F. Supp. 244, 247 (E.D.N.Y. 1957);
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System82 a California district court noted that there was in-
deed disagreement over the issue and held subsequently
that Article 28 addresses venue.8 3 Thus, a motion to dismiss
based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction would fail.84
Other courts, however, have held that Article 28 of the War-
saw Convention prescribes jurisdiction. 5 In such courts,
venue is only addressed after treaty and subject matterjuris-
diction are established.86 The general consensus currently
holds that Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention is ajurisdic-
tional provision.81
B. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
Once treaty jurisdiction is established, the courts move to
the question of whether subject matter jurisdiction is pres-
ent.88 Some state courts have found that jurisdiction exists
because a claim is based on negligence, or even contract.89
One court, noting that a suit was proper, found that with-
out even referring to the Montreal Agreement 9° in the com-
plaint, since the Montreal Agreement was applicable as an
amendment to the Warsaw Convention and the carrier
Berner v. United Air Lines, Inc., 147 N.E.2d 732 (N.Y. 1957). Some other cases
holding that Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention addresses venue are: Eck, 360 F.2d
at 814; Brown v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 8 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,272
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Spencer v. Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 504, 505-06
(S.D.N.Y. 1962); Dunning v. Pan American World Airways, 4 Av. Cas. (CCH)
17,394, 17,395 (D.D.C. 1954); Mason, 5 Av. Cas. (CCH) at 17,121.
82 329 F. Supp. 1081 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
83 Id. at 1082.
84 Id.
- Smith v. Canadian Pac. Airways, 452 F.2d 798, 800-01 (2d Cir. 1971).
86 Id.
87 Id.; see also In re Air Crash Disaster in Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21,
1988, 928 F.2d 1267, 1271-82 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 331 (1991); In reAir
Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, Louisiana on July 9, 1982, 821 F.2d 1147, 1161-78
(5th Cir. 1987), vacated 490 U.S. 1032 (1989); Gayda, 702 F.2d at 425; Air Crash Disas-
ter Near Cove Neck, 774 F. Supp. at 736.
- Smith v. Canadian, 452 F.2d at 800-01.
- Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 11, at 522-26, 575-78.
- See supra note 40.
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agreed that it was applicable, the carrier would be bound by
its provisions, absent a valid defense. 91
It is possible for federal subject matter jurisdiction to ex-
ist in a case governed by the Warsaw Convention based on
diversity.92 The Warsaw Convention has been held not to
encompass a political question.93 Courts have also found
that federal question jurisdiction may exist in a Warsaw
Convention case.94 Nonetheless, whether the Warsaw Con-
vention itself creates an independent cause of action merits
separate consideration.
91 Dunn, 589 F.2d at 413. But see Notarian, 244 F. Supp. 874 (holding that the
Warsaw Convention must be plead before procedural motions based on the Warsaw
Convention may be made).
- Stud v. Trans Int'l Airlines, 727 F.2d 880, 881-82 (9th Cir. 1984) (addressing
both federal question and diversity jurisdiction). But see Halmos v. Pan Am. World
Airways, 727 F. Supp. 122 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding that there was no treaty jurisdic-
tion because there was not complete diversity).
93 Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. at 254. Finding that the Warsaw Convention con-
cerned a political question would, of course, remove jurisdiction of the matters gov-
erned by it from the courts. Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). For
discussion of the political question doctrine, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962)
(announcing many of the types of cases that concern political questions, such as
foreign relations, determination of dates of duration of hostilities, validity of enact-
ments, and recognition of governments); see also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996
(1979) (foreign relations); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U,.S. 1 (1973) (regulating the
militia); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (determining qualifications of
members of congress); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912)
(power to levy tax). In essence, the political question doctrine holds that the courts
do not have jurisdiction where there is a:
textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a co-
ordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate
branches of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning ad-
herence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of em-
barrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
Baker v. Camf 369 U.S. at 217. Obviously, the Warsaw Convention does not implicate
any of these areas, and, particularly, the jurisdictional provision of the convention
does not, as it specifically designates the courts of the forum before which the suit is
brought as competent to decide jurisdictional issues consistently with their own local
rules. Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28(2). Conceivably, orders of the Civil
Aeronautics Board could conflict with certain judicial determinations, but not with
respect to jurisdiction, and that issue is beyond the scope of this comment.
- Stud, 727 F.2d at 880.
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1. Does The Warsaw Convention Create An Independent Cause
of Action?
In analyzing subject matter jurisdiction, the issue of
whether the Warsaw Convention creates an independent
cause of action, and hence, federal question subject-matter
jurisdiction, has received considerable attention. In fact,
this very question was a hotly debated topic for some time.95
When the United States first adopted the Warsaw Conven-
tion, the common wisdom was that the convention created
an independent cause of action.96 Nevertheless, several
courts began to hold that the Warsaw Convention did not
create an independent cause of action, and that some other
basis for subject-matter jurisdiction had to be relied upon.97
Two landmark cases, decided in the Second Circuit, set
the tone for subject-matter jurisdiction under the Warsaw
Convention. For more than two decades, these cases stood
for the proposition, among other things, that the Warsaw
Convention did not create an independent cause of ac-
tion.98 Subsequently, federal courts only dealt with Warsaw
Convention cases if diversity jurisdiction requirements were
met.99 First, in Komlos the Second Circuit affirmed, albeit
impliedly, dicta in the district court's opinion that the War-
0 See G. Nathan Calkins, Jr., The Cause of Action Under the Warsaw Convention, 26J.
AIR L. & COM. 323 (1959); Patricia S. Hohl, Note, Trend for Finding an Independent
Cause of Action in the Warsaw Convention strengthened by Removal of Jurisdictional
Problems, Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics v. Pan Am. World Airways, 737 F.2d 456
(5th Cir. 1984), 9 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L.J. 67 (1985).
9 See Glenn Pogust, Note, The Warsaw Convention-Does it Create a Cause of Action?,
47 FolRDm L. REv. 366 (1978); Note, The Warsaw Convention Creates a Cause of Action
for Wrongful Death-Benjamins v. British European Airways, 38 MD. L. REv. 120
(1978).
97 Zousmer v. Canadian Pac. Air Lines, 307 F. Supp. 892, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1969);
Notarian, 244 F. Supp. at 877.
9 Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 907 (1957), overrded by Benjamins v. European Airways, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir.
1978); Komlos v. Compagnie Nationale Air France, 209 F.2d 436 (2d Cir. 1953), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 820 (1954), overruled by Benjamins, 572 F.2d 913 (2d Cir. 1978).
- Noe4 247 F.2d at 997; Komlos, 209 F.2d at 440; see also Zousmer, 307 F. Supp. at
899 (no independent cause of action); Notanian, 244 F. Supp. 874 (same); Spencer v.
Northwest Orient Airlines, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1962) (noting that the
Warsaw Convention does not create any new substantive rights); Fernandez, 156 F.
Supp. at 877, (S.D.N.Y. 1957) (same).
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saw Convention did not create an independent cause of ac-
tion. °° Second, in Noel the Second Circuit specifically held
that the reasoning in Komlos was correct in that the Warsaw
Convention did not create an independent cause of
action. 01
This reasoning was generally followed for more than two
decades; 10 then, in 1978, the Second Circuit reevaluated its
decisions in Komlos and Noel, and held that the Warsaw Con-
vention did create an independent cause of action for
wrongful death in Benjamins v. British European Airways.' 3
Since Benjamins, other courts have followed the Second Cir-
cuit's lead, holding that the Warsaw Convention does create
an independent cause of action, thereby satisfying federal
question subject matter jurisdiction requirements.' 4
C. PERSONAL JURISDICrION
As noted above, the third test that must be met for juris-
diction under the Warsaw Convention is whether the court
before which the action is brought has jurisdiction over the
defendant. 0 5 The distinction between treaty jurisdiction
and personal jurisdiction may seem confused in analysis of
cases applying Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention. Many
1- Komlos, 209 F.2d at 438.
lo, Noe,, 247 F.2d at 679. For an in depth discussion of the cause of action under
the Warsaw Convention, and a particularly critical contemporaneous discussion of
the holdings in Kom/os and Nol, see Calkins, supra note 95.
102 See, e.g., cases cited supra at note 97.
103 572 F.2d 913, 916 (2d Cir. 1978).
04 E.g., Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics v. Pan Am. World Airways, 737 F.2d
456, 458 (5th Cir. 1984); Stud, 727 F.2d 880; Enayati v. Lufthansa German Airlines,
714 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Mexico City Aircrash of Oct. 31, 1979, 708 F.2d
400, 415 (9th Cir. 1983); see also Floyd B. Chapman, Note, Exclusivity and the Warsaw
Convention: In Re Air Disaster At Lockerbie, Scotland, 23 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 493
(1992) (discussing many of the cases listed above as to whether the Warsaw Conven-
tion creates an independent cause of action, focusing on whether it provides the
exclusive cause of action for air disaster cases brought under the convention. The
article addresses the preemption of state law issue and follows the progression of the
courts noted in the text accompanying supra notes 94 to 102, finding that the Sec-
ond and Fifth Circuits closed the door on state law based claims in Air Crash Disaster
in Lockerbie, 928 F.2d at 1267; and Boehringer-Mannheim Diagnostics, 737 F.2d at 458,
respectively).
105 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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of the cases identified above, dealing with issues such as the
principle place of business, domicile, and place of business
through which the contract was made, seem surprisingly
close to what students of American jurisprudence recognize
as sufficient contacts analysis for purposes of personal juris-
diction of the courts along the lines of doctrine set forth in
cases such as International Shoe 06 and World-Wide Volk-
swagen.10 7 Such confusion is further borne out by the de-
bate, discussed above, over whether Article 28 of the
Warsaw Convention is a venue or jurisdiction provision. 108
The source of the confusion arises as a result of the na-
ture of the American legal system in that the United States
is broken into many different political subdivisions, each
with their own infrastructure of courts, and the division of
federal courts into different circuits and districts. The con-
trast between the provisions of Article 28(1) and Article
28(2) of the Warsaw Convention sets the stage.10 9 Article
28(1) lists specific places where an action may be brought,
and Article 28(2) provides that the courts apply local rules
to questions of procedure.110
Much of this confusion can be resolved by taking the na-
tional scope of Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention into
consideration. As noted above, treaty jurisdiction con-
ferred under Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention is na-
tional and does not refer to political subdivisions or specific
courts.1 ' But, once national treaty jurisdiction is estab-
lished, courts still apply local law, under the provisions of
Article 28(2), as to whether a specific court has personal
jurisdiction over the defendant.11 2
326 U.S. 310 (1945) (requiring a party to have minimum contacts with the
forum state in order for jurisdiction to be proper).
107 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (holding that, even given minimum contacts, a party must
realistically foresee being haled into a specific court in order for jurisdiction to be
proper).
-08 See supra notes 95-104 and accompanying text.
109 See Charles E. Robbins, Jurisdiction Under Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention, 9
McGILL LJ. 352 (1963).
110 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28(1), (2).
II' See supra notes 59-69 and accompanying text.
112 See supra notes 64-69 and accompanying text.
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Merely because a district court determines that the courts
of the United States are an appropriate jurisdiction in
which the case may be brought under one of the four spe-
cific provisions of Article 28(1) does not mean that the dis-
trict court will necessarily exercise personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. 1 3 For example, a contract for round
trip transportation between New Orleans and London may
have been made and sold through a sales office in New Or-
leans, thereby satisfying the third jurisdictional provision of
Article 28(1)." But, conceivably, the carrier may not have
any offices in that district and may not perform any flights
into or out of any airports in that district. As such, the dis-
trict court may well determine that the carrier did not have
sufficient contact with the forum to satisfy personal
jurisdiction."'
In addressing personal jurisdiction, the courts apply
traditional minimum contacts analysis (requiring some con-
tact with the forum jurisdiction).116 Many state's long arm
statutes will bring a carrier within the jurisdiction of the
courts." 7 Courts also have analyzed personal jurisdiction
based on the place of business through which the contract
for transportation was made, applying theories of agency." 8
Courts have also held that jurisdiction was not proper due
to a lack of adequate service of process." 9
I" See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text, discussing the series of analytical
steps a court addresses in determining its jurisdiction.
14 The place through which the contract for carriage was made, discussed supra,
at notes 73-75 and accompanying text.
'is In one case, the courts determined that even though the suit was properly
brought in America, the courts did not have personal jurisdiction over the defend-
ant where the suit alleged improper maintenance of a walkway by the Copenhagen
airport authority and the Kingdom of Denmark because those defendants did not
have enough contacts with the United States. Schmidkunz v. Scandinavian Airlines
Sys., 628 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1980). The Supreme Court of Utah also applied a doing
business/minimum contacts analysis in Mabud v. Pakistan Int'l Airlines, 717 P.2d
1350 (Utah 1986).
116 See supra notes 73-75, 112-114, and accompanying text.
17 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 11, at 575-78.
118 Id. at 522-26, 575-78.
119 Id.
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1. Removal and Forum Non Conveniens
Actions brought under the Warsaw Convention in state
courts may be removed to federal courts pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1441 if the action could have commenced origi-
nally in federal court.1 2 1 In Mertens v. Flying Tiger Line,
Inc.121 the Second Circuit held that, in a case governed by
the Warsaw Convention, the defendant could move for a
transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) and could object to
venue under 28 U.S.C. § 1391.122 There has been dispute,
however, over whether the Warsaw Convention precludes a
court from applying its local rules for determining appro-
priate venue.1 23
At least one court has addressed the issue of whether an
action falling under the terms of the Warsaw Convention
can be removed on the basis of forum non conveniens.124 In
Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, the plaintiffs argued that
the doctrine of forum non conveniens should not be applica-
ble in a case governed by the Warsaw Convention because
the language of Article 28(1) gave the plaintiff the absolute
choice of a forum. 25 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
answered by holding to the contrary-forum non conveniens
is applicable in Warsaw Convention cases-noting that
whether the doctrine applied in cases governed by the War-
saw Convention was raised only once before, and the court
-0 David & Lawrence, supra note 55, at 428.
12, 341 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 816 (1965), overruled by, Chan
v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122 (1989).
1 Id. at 855-58. (noting that such issues would be governed by the procedural
rules of the court before which the motion was presented, and not the provisions of
the Warsaw Convention)
- See discussion supra notes 95-104 and accompanying text as to the dispute over
the status of Article 28 of the Warsaw Convention as a venue or jurisdiction
provision.
124 Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d at 1161-78 (applying forum non
conveniens doctrine in a Warsaw Convention case); see also Compagnie National Air
France v. Giliberto, 383 N.E.2d 977, 984-88 (11. 1978) (finding the lower court
abused its discretion in upholding jurisdiction in Illinois where the only connection
the airline had with the forum was the maintenance of a sales office in Illinois).
12- Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d at 1160.
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declined to decide the issue. 26 The court also noted that
other courts had applied the doctrine of forum non con-
veniens in Warsaw Convention cases without making refer-
ence to any potential conflict with the terms of Article
28(1).127
Along similar lines, courts have also grappled with choice
of law issues.12 8 Particularly, the court in Air Crash Disaster
Near New Orleans addressed which law to apply, that of Loui-
siana or Uruguay. t29  But, the court addressed two addi-
tional interesting questions: 1) whether choice-of-law issues
entered the forum non conveniens analysis; and 2) whose ver-
sion of the forum non conveniens doctrine to apply.130 First,
the court held that choice-of-law issues should be avoided
when addressing forum non conveniens questions.13 1 Second,
the court held that the federal courts should apply uniform
rules when deciding these points, and, as such, federal com-
mon law principles of forum non conveniens should be ap-
plied, rather than the particular rules of the distinct
forum.13 2
As is evident from the above discussion, jurisdiction
under the Warsaw Convention is no simple matter. Courts
I2N Id. (citing Irish Nat'l Ins. Co., v. Aer Lingus Teoranta, 739 F.2d 90, 91 (2d Cir.
1984).
7Id. (citing McLoughlin v. Commercial Airways (PTY) Ltd., 602 F. Supp. 29, 33
(E.D.N.Y. 1985)).
128 Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1987) (finding that
Polish law would be applied in a wrongful death action brought under the Warsaw
Convention in California). For a discussion of the conflict of laws issues in Harris,
see Nancy M. Hewitt, Note, Polish Law Governs in California Wrongful Death Action,
Harris v. Polskie Linie Lotnicze, 820 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1987), 12 SuFroLz TW.4s-
NAT'L L.J. 637 (1989).
129 Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d at 1152. See also Elizabeth C. Black,
Note, Further Interpretation of the Scope of Artide 28, Trivelloni-Lorenzi v. Pan American
World Airways, 821 F.2d 1147 (5th Cir. 1987), 12 SurFroL TRANSNAT'L L.J. 173
(1988) (discussing the availability of the doctrine of forum non conveniens in Warsaw
Convention cases in light of Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans).
1-0 Air Crash Disaster Near New Orleans, 821 F.2d at 1153.
1 Id. at 1163.
2 Id. at 1159. For a concise discussion, analyzed in the context of Air Crash Disas-
ter Near New Orleans, of the matters of which version of the doctrine to apply and
whether choice-of-law issues should enter the scenario, see Sonya Scates & Richard
L. Coffman, Comment, The Abuse of Rule 11 and Forum Non Conveniens: Fast, Effective
Relief for Federal Docket Congestion?, 7 REv. LrrG. 311, 341-44 (1988).
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must go through a four-step analysis, as well as consider
venue and removal questions.13 3 To complicate matters,
the Warsaw Convention specifically provides four bases for
bringing an action before a certain court,1 3 4 which serve to
determine if a court has treaty jurisdiction.1 35 Three of the
four bases refer to characteristics of the carrier,1 3 6 but the
fourth is founded on destination.
IV. JURISDICTION BASED ON DESTINATION
"An action for damages [may] be brought ... before the court at
the place of destination. 131
As noted above, destination is perhaps the farthest reach-
ing and broadest basis for jurisdiction contained in the
Warsaw Convention.1 38 At the surface, destination would
seem rather simple to determine. Ask anyone on an air-
plane: where are you going, or, what's your destination?
Odds are they can tell you the answer without any hesita-
tion. The answer, for Warsaw Convention purposes is not
so simple, though, especially when things start going wrong,
such as when the plane crashes and a suit is brought.
A. ISSUES THAT MAY INVOLVE A QUESTION BEARING ON
THE DETERMINATION OF DESTINATION UNDER THE
WARSAW CONVENTION
Asking a passenger where he is going will give you that
person's definition of his destination. But, for Warsaw Con-
133 See supra notes 53-58 and accompanying text. Courts are generally free to ap-
ply their own local procedural rules, but as detailed above, the federal courts may be
limited to applying only federal common law instead of local rules where the forum
non conveniens doctrine is applied. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
's' Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28(1); see also, supra notes 53-79 and
accompanying text.
"35 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28(1).
13The domicile, principal place of business, and place of business through which
the contract was made or purchased, listed in Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Conven-
tion, all relate to aspects of the carrier, and the domicile of the passenger and place
of accident were specifically excluded from the language of the Warsaw Convention;
see infra notes 176-199 and accompanying text.
"3 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28(1).
"3 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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vention purposes, that answer could easily be different than
the destination that the Warsaw Convention would assign to
that same passenger. If someone purchases a round-trip
ticket for travel between New York and London and is
asked where he is going while on the flight from new York
to London, the likely response would be London. Gener-
ally speaking, though, that same person's destination would
be New York under the Warsaw Convention, since courts
have held that in travel involving a round-trip the destina-
tion for Warsaw Convention purposes is the place of origi-
nation.1 3 9 This determination that destination is the place
of origin in a New York to London round-trip transporta-
tion arrangement applies regardless of whether the acci-
dent occurred on the trip from New York to London.140
Aside from the issue of round-trip travel, there are a
number of different scenarios under which the determina-
tion of destination may be an issue, which are discussed in
the following sections. Lurking in all of these situations,
including the above simple example of a round-trip ticket,
is the question of whether the passenger's intent should
have any bearing on the determination of destination.
Should the contract for transportation (ticket book) be the
conclusive determinant of destination, or, notwithstanding
the destination listed on the ticket, should the passenger's
intent control the determination of destination?
1. Tickets Bought in a Series of Contracts, or Issued in More
Than One Booklet
If a passenger has arranged a trip for which two different
books of tickets are issued, which destination controls? If
an accident occurs on a flight that is covered by the first
book of tickets, is the destination that which is shown in the
first book of tickets, or is it the ultimate destination as desig-
nated in the last of the books? By the same token, if ar-
139 See Air Crash Disaster Near Cove Neck, 774 F. Supp. at 726; Butz, 421 F. Supp. at
130-31.
-o See infra notes 187-198 and accompanying text.
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rangements for the transportation was arranged in a series
of contracts, which contract controls destination?
The Second Circuit recently addressed this exact prob-
lem in Petrire v. Spantax, S.A., 141 in which the plaintiff con-
tracted for round trip travel from Madrid, Spain to New
York, by way of Malaga, Spain, and back to Madrid.1 42 The
tickets were issued to the plaintiff in two books, the first
containing two coupons for the travel from Madrid to Mal-
aga to New York, and the second containing one coupon
for travel from New York to Madrid.143 Although the plain-
tiff was injured on the Malaga to New York portion of the
trip, the circuit court affirmed the district court's dismissal
of the case, which was based on lack of jurisdiction because
Madrid was determined to be the destination of the
travel. 144
The basis for the ruling in Petrire was that for Warsaw
Convention purposes the determination of destination is
based on the " 'single operation' of 'undivided transporta-
tion' as 'regarded by the parties,' whether that transporta-
tion is ticketed in one or a series of contracts." 45 The court
also noted that it would be a far stretch to find that destina-
tion might depend on whether three coupons were at-
tached in two books, whether the two books were stapled
together, or whether the travel agent used two books be-
14, 756 F.2d 263 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 846 (1985).
142 Id. at 264-65.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 265.
145 Id. at 266; see also In re Alleged Food Poisoning Incident, March, 1984, 770 F.2d
3, 6-7 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that a ticket clearly showing Saudi Arabia as the final
destination controlled the determination of destination despite the fact that the
tickets were contained in two books); Vergara v. Aeroflat, 390 F. Supp. 1266 (D.
Neb. 1975) (finding one undivided transportation encompassing a complex around
the world journey in six ticket books of four coupons each, issued at one time and
place). Compare Karfunkel, 427 F. Supp. at 973-74 (finding that two different tickets
that were bought at different times in which the first portion of travel was purchased
without any reference to a second leg of the transportation did not comprise one
single operation of undivided transportation) with Stratton v. Trans Canada Air
Lines, 7 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,724 (Brit. Col. Sup. Ct. 1961) (finding distinct con-
tracts and, hence, destinations where different books were purchased at different




cause he didn't have books with enough coupons in them
to accomplish the transaction in one book.'46
The issue of passenger intent was raised in this case be-
cause the plaintiff alleged that a purpose for having two
ticket books was to "assur[e] Article 28 jurisdiction in a de-
sired national venue."147 The court dismissed this conten-
tion, holding that just asking for two booklets can not
change the unitary nature of the arrangement. 48 The
court did not address the issue, however, in which a plain-
tiff, intending to travel to one specific destination, is issued
a return or round trip ticket by mistake. 49
2. Transportation That Is Effected Through More Than One
Carrier
Another situation that raises destination questions is
when more than one carrier is involved in the international
transportation. For instance, it is entirely conceivable that
one carrier may not be able to service the entire travel con-
templated because many carriers that service cities abroad
do not serve many smaller cities within the United States. If
a passenger is injured on a flight from London to Abu
Dhabi, on a British Airways plane, when the entire trip con-
sists of round trip transportation between Saranac Lake,
New York and Abu Dhabi by way of London, is destination
affected by the fact that different carriers are involved in
different portions of the transportation because no single
airline served the route?
As in the case of different tickets and ticket books, analy-
sis of the issue of successive carriers focuses on the single
operation of undivided transportation concept. 5 ° Conse-
quently, if the transportation contemplated is viewed as one
single undivided transportation arrangement, the fact that
10 Petir, 756 F.2d at 265.
147 Id. at 266.
148 Id.
149 Id.
-So See Alleged Food Poisoning Inciden4 770 F.2d at 6-7; Petrire, 756 F.2d at 266; In re
Air Crash Disaster at Warsaw, Poland, on Mar. 14, 1980, 748 F.2d 94, 96-97 (2d Cir.
1984).
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different carriers provide distinct parts of the transporta-
tion will not create more than one destination-the desti-
nation for Warsaw Convention purposes will be the ultimate
destination that is shown on the ticket.15'
In the hypothetical above, it is even possible that the air-
line providing the transportation from London to Abu
Dhabi would not have any flights into, or out of, the United
States. In such a case, the Abu Dhabi airline would still be
subject to jurisdiction based on destination in the United
States.1 52 In that instance, however, the court would still
have to establish personal jurisdiction over the airline, but
existing long arm statutes and minimum contacts analysis
make it possible to establish jurisdiction in many of these
instances.' 53 For example, if an airline sold tickets from an
office in the United States, that alone would probably satisfy
personal jurisdiction."5 4 Even sales through an agent for
the airline would likely satisfy treaty jurisdiction require-
ments; but, a key issue would center around whether service
of process upon the airline was properly executed.' 5
Even if different carriers originally were not contem-
plated in the transaction, the fact that a different carrier
provides part of the transportation originally contemplated
will not change the ultimate destination of a ticket. In Bris-
coe v. Compagnie National Air France56 a passenger bought a
ticket for travel from New York to Paris, then on to Bel-
grade, and back via the same route, but left the return por-
tion of the ticket open as to time and date of departure. 57
The time and date that the passenger chose for her return
was not serviced by the original carrier, and a different car-
rier was substituted.'58 Since the substituted carrier was a
successive carrier for Warsaw Convention purposes pursu-
151 Id.
152 Lowenfeld & Mendelsohn, supra note 11, at 522-26, 575-78.
153 Id.
4 Id (giving a similar example through analysis of certain case law).
155 Id.
156 290 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
,-1 Id. at 864-65.
' Id. at 865.
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ant to Article 30,159 the court held that the original carrier
could not be held liable.16 But, the court did not hold that
the successive carrier would not be subject to Warsaw Con-
vention jurisdiction in the United States based on the desti-
nation of the transportation.
3. Transportation That Involves Several Different Legs or
Layovers for Extended Periods
Air travel for vacation purposes can involve stops in more
than one location, and those stops can often last for more
than a few hours or days. Likewise, transportation can also
involve stays at an intermediate destination for extended
periods of time, as in the case of business travel. Does the
fact that the transportation is not continuous in the sense of
passage of time generate more than one destination?
Once again, the analysis boils down to the old single op-
eration of undivided transportation concept. In Vergara the
plaintiff was involved in an extended trip around the world
with numerous stopping places. 161 The court held there
can only be one ultimate destination, and that is the final
destination shown on the ticket (in this case the last of four
books).162 In another case, where the plaintiff traveled
from London to New York and back making use of a forty-
five day excursion fare, despite the long stay in New York,
the court held that the transportation would be viewed as
one undivided arrangement for transportation, ergo, the
destination was London. 163
15 Article 30(2) provides: "In the case of transportation [by successive carriers],
the passenger... can take action only against the carrier who performed the trans-
portation during which the accident or the delay occurred, save in the case where,
by express agreement, the first carrier has assumed liability for the whole journey."
Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 30(2).
1- Briscoe, 290 F. Supp. at 866-67.
161 Vergara, 390 F. Supp. at 1267-68.,
162 Id. at 1269.
163 Butz, 421 F. Supp. at 129; see also Alleged Food Poisoning Inciden4 770 F.2d at 6
(holding that the determination of the ultimate destination is not changed by the
presence of agreed stopping places en route); Gayda, 702 F.2d at 425 (same).
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4. Tickets That Are Purchased by Someone Other Than the
Passenger Who Was Unaware of the Passenger's Actual
Intent
In one case, an employer bought a ticket for an em-
ployee's round trip travel between Canada and the Orient
(including stops in Taipei, Seoul, and Hong Kong) via New
York.16 4 The plaintiff lived and worked in New York, con-
tended he intended only to travel between New York and
the Orient, introduced evidence of a past history of such
trips, and, therefore, argued that his destination was New
York.16 The court held that there was no mutuality of
agreement with respect to his intended itinerary-there
was no way that the airline could have known his intent-
and the destination specified on the ticket (Montreal)
would control.1 6 6 In so holding, the court left open the pos-
sibility that, where there was such mutuality of agreement,
the court might look beyond the destination listed on the
ticket.
5. Tickets Bought With Open Return Provisions With Respect
to Time, Date, Right, or Carrier
In Aanestad v. Air Canada, Inc.167 a passenger bought a
round-trip ticket, issued in two coupons, one for each leg of
the round trip travel, from Montreal to Los Angeles. The
return portion of the tickets contained open return provi-
sions, specifying only that return travel had to be accom-
plished within a certain time frame.' 68 The plane crashed
in Canada while en route to Los Angeles.1 69 The court held
that the open return provision was, in effect, an option con-
tract and not a contract for travel; the passenger could have
164 In re Korean Air Lines Disaster of Sept. 1, 1983, 664 F. Supp. 1478, 1479-80
(D.D.C. 1986), aff'd sub nom. Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122 (1989). The
employer bought the ticket through a travel agent in Montreal to take advantage of
lower fares that were apparently only available for tickets purchased in Canada. Id.
165 Id.
- Id. at 1480.
167 390 F. Supp. 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
16a Id. at 1166-67.
169 Id. at 1168.
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decided not to use the return portion of the ticket.1 70 Con-
sequently, since the passenger could have intended to stay
in California (not call the option) and the portion of the
ticket for travel to Los Angeles was a valid contract, the des-
tination was Los Angeles, and not Montreal.1 7 ' Thus, the
court did not directly hold that passenger intent controlled
the determination of destination. Rather, classifying the
open portion of the ticket as an option contract allowed the
court to find an ultimate destination at a place other than
that of the place of origin in a travel transaction involving a
round trip.
Twelve years later, the same court placed the possibility
that passenger intent could control the determination of
destination squarely to rest in Lee v. China Airlines.'72 Fol-
lowing a line of reasoning critical of the Aanestad decision,
found in Butz v. British Airways,173 the Lee court held that
even when a return provision is left open, the carrier is obli-
gated to transport the passenger on the return segment and
the passenger is obligated to pay for that segment (and did
in this case)."' As such, the contract requirement of mutu-
ality of obligation was satisfied and a consequent binding
contract for carriage resulted, thereby precluding the possi-
bility of finding a destination other than the place of origin
in a round trip travel transaction where the return provi-
sions are left open, and also removing the chance that dif-
fering passenger intent could have any subsequent effect on
the determination of destination.1
75
170.Id. at 1167-68.
7 Id. at 1168.
172 669 F. Supp. 979 (C.D. Cal. 1987).
173 421 F. Supp. 127, 129-31 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 566 F.2d 1168 (3d Cir. 1977).
174 Lee, 669 F. Supp. at 981-82.
175 Id.; see also Swaminathan v. Swiss Air Transp. Co., 962 F.2d 387, 389 (5th Cir.
1992); Hurley v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 562 F. Supp. 260, 261 (C.D. Cal. 1983),
vacated, 602 F. Supp. 1249 (C.D. Cal. 1985); both discussed in greater detail, infra at
notes 175-182, and 191-198 and accompanying text.
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V. SQUARELY FACING THE ISSUE OF
PASSENGER INTENT
Thus far, the discussion has focused on situations where
the issue of passenger intent, and its effect on the determi-
nation of destination, has been lurking on the sidelines, or
has not been squarely addressed. There have been a
number of cases, however, that have addressed the issue in
no uncertain terms and are discussed in the following
section.
A. OPEN RETURN REVISITED
In Hurley v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines176 the same court
that decided Aanestad 77 found itself facing another open
return case.1 78 The plaintiff, a United States citizen and
permanent resident of California, had bought a round trip
ticket from Saudi Arabia to California, with intermediate
stops.1 79 The court concluded that, in the instance of round
trip travel, at least two destinations may exist. 180
Additionally, the court stated that the "determination of
whether a particular stop constitutes a place of destination
is to be determined on a case to case basis taking into ac-
count such factors as the passenger's intent, the nature of the
stop[,] and the length of the stop."' 8 ' In determining the
proper destination in this case, the court considered the
plaintiff's assertions, which were not rebutted by the de-
fendant, that she traveled to California to be examined by
and to consult with her physician and that she was not cer-
tain she would return to Saudi Arabia when she started the
transportation because of her health concerns, among
176 562 F. Supp. 260 (C.D. Cal. 1983), vacated, 602 F. Supp. 1249 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
1" 390 F. Supp. 1165 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (holding an open return ticket to be an
option, and therefore finding a destination different than the ultimate destination,
or place of origin in a round trip travel transaction).
178 Hurley, 562 F. Supp. at 260.
17 Id.
- Id. at 261.
l81 Id. (emphasis added) (citing Aanestad, 390 F. Supp. 1165, for the proposition
that the Warsaw Convention refers to at least two places of destination).
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other things.18 2 The court held that these facts constituted
a sufficient basis to conclude that California was the appro-
priate destination, when combined with the plaintiff's
United States citizenship, her California residency, and the
open status of her return ticket.18 3
B. THE PASSENGER ONLY BOUGHT A ROUND TRIP TICKET
TO SATISFY PERCEIVED EMIGRATION
REGULATIONS l a4
The district court for the Eastern District of New York has
held that "the ultimate destination of the passenger is the
place where the passenger intended to end up and would
have ended up but for the accident."1 8 5 The basis for this
holding was the premise that the Warsaw Convention was
not intended to impose the hardship of litigating in an un-
familiar country. 6 The court felt the Warsaw Convention
must have specified the ultimate destination as an appropri-
ate place for bringing suit because the passenger would
likely have a "permanent relationship," there and, hence,
that same country would have a "particular interest" in hav-
ing the action brought in its courts.18 7
The Air Crash Near Warsaw court also held that the "inten-
tion of the passenger alone, and not the mutual intention
of the parties as expressed in the contract or otherwise,"
controls the determination of destination.8 8 But, the court
went on to say that the contract should create the presump-
182 Id.
183 Id.
184 Those traveling to Caribbean destinations may discover (as I did when
planning my honeymoon) that one method to gain entry to many of the islands is to
show possession of a ticket either for travel on through the island to another
destination, or a return to the original place of departure, that is, a round trip ticket.
Thus, satisfying Immigration rules conceivably also could be a reason for buying a
round trip ticket while never intending to use the return portion of the ticket.
Staying on a Caribbean island for an extended period of time is, after all, not that
bad a proposition for many individuals.
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tion that the final destination is that which is listed on the
ticket, with the burden of proving a different destination
based on contrary intent placed on the party raising the is-
sue.' 89 In this case, the facts that the court felt rebutted
that presumption were that the plaintiff's decedents were
permanent residents of the United States who only bought
their round trip tickets from Poland to New York because
they believed that Polish law required that they purchase
round trip tickets and because they feared disclosing to Po-
lish authorities their true intention to stay in the United
States.1 90 One plaintiff also introduced evidence that her
decedents had purchased round trip tickets on previous oc-
casions and had returned the unused portion for reim-
bursement in those instances, and the other plaintiff
showed that her decedent intended to return the unused
portion for reimbursement. 9
The Court recognized that giving credence to passenger
intent in the determination of destination might invite liti-
gation and fraud. But the court dismissed the allegation
that their holding would induce fraud and invite increased
litigation because, "in an overwhelming majority of cases,
the passenger will intend to travel to the ultimate destina-
tion listed on the ticket" and resolving questions of fraud
couched in contract terms would not represent a material
increase in the burden on the courts.192
C. A RouND-TRIP TICKET WAS CHEAPER THAN
A ONE WAY TICKET
Thus, we have come full circle back to the scenario that
started this comment. Indeed, there are two cases in which
the plaintiff tried to establish an intermediate destination
based on the fact that he intended only to use one portion
of the ticket, having bought a round trip ticket because it
189 Id.
'- In re Air Disaster Near Warsaw, 760 F. Supp. at 32-33.
191 Id. at 32.
19 Id,
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was cheaper than a one way ticket. 9 In Solanki the District
Court for the Southern District of New York held that the
intent objectively manifested by Solanki controlled the de-
termination of destination, and the objective manifestation
of that intent was his purchase of a round trip ticket.'94
The court went on to provide a policy rationale for its deci-
sion by saying "Kuwait Airways certainly intended to provide
[the round-trip] service in return for a round-trip fare, and
not to later grant a refund of Solanki's return fare while
allowing him to travel to New York less expensively than he
otherwise would have otherwise been able to do." 95
The Swaminathan court squarely addressed the holding in
Air Crash Near Warsaw 96 that the intent of the parties is
what controlled in determining destination. 97 The court
conceded that "a passenger's intent deserves considerable
weight when ascertaining the final destination", but ex-
pressly rejected the contention that the passenger's intent
alone, and not the objective manifestation of intent as
shown on the ticket, was the means for determining desti-
nation for Warsaw Convention purposes.' 8 Instead, the
court held that the objective manifestation of intent ex-
pressed in the contract, and not the subjective intent of the
passenger, was the controlling measure of intent. 99 Find-
ing that the contract for Swaminathan's travel was unambig-
uous, clearly listing both the point of departure and
10 Swaminathan, 962 F.2d at 389 (noting also that the return portion of the ticket
was left open); Solanki v. Kuwait Airways, 1987 WL 13194, *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 24,
1987) (having an open return provision).
- Solanhi, 1987 WL 13194 at *2 (citing Bu, 421 F. Supp. 127; Alleged Food Poison-
ing Incident, 770 F.2d 3; Gayda, 702 F.2d 424; and Smith v. Canadian, 452 F.2d 798, for
the contention that the place of origin is the place of destination in round trip travel
as determined by reference to the ticket without consideration of passenger intent).
195 Solanki, 1987 WL 13194 at *2.
1 760 F. Supp. 30 (discussed in detail, supra notes 183-190 and accompanying
text).
197 Swaminathan, 962 F.2d at 389.
19 Id.
'" Id. The court noted that in interpretation of contracts, subjective intent con-
trols, and unambiguous contracts are the express manifestations of that subjective
intent themselves. Id. (citing Shelton v. Exxon Corp., 921 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1991));
Fuller v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 872 F.2d 655 (5th Cir. 1989).
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destination on the ticket with only the exact date and time
for the return uncertain, the court held that the point of
departure and destination were one and the same, disre-
garding Swaminathan's statement of his subjective intent to
the contrary.2 °°
VI. CONCLUSION
As detailed above, only a handful of cases have decided
that the passenger's subjective intent has bearing on the de-
termination of destination for jurisdictional purposes
under the Warsaw Convention.' In one case, the same
court that found intent has bearing on the determination
in two early cases later rejected the proposition.0 2 The
court in Alleged Food Poisoning Incident25 found intent to
have some place in the analysis, but the intent that was con-
sidered was the intent of the parties, that is, the objective
manifestation of intent, or the terms of the contract, not
the subjective intent of the passenger.2 4 The only case that
has flatly held that the passenger's subjective intent is the
sole deciding factor in determining destination under the
Warsaw Convention and which has not been rejected by a
court in the same district is the Second Circuit's Air Crash
Disaster Near Warsaw.20 5 That holding was expressly rejected
by the Fifth Circuit in Swaminathan as being both an un-
workable standard and inconsistent with the rules for con-
struing contracts. 20 6
The Warsaw Convention is a treaty entered into by the
United States, and thus, is afforded the status of the
200 Id. (citing Korean Air Lines Disaster, 664 F. Supp. 1478; Lee, 669 F. Supp. 979;
and Petrire, 756 F.2d 263).
20 See supra notes 135-189 and accompanying text, specifically noting Alleged Food
Poisoning Incident 770 F.2d 3; and Air Crash Disaster Near Warsaw, 760 F. Supp. 30;
Hurley, 562 F. Supp. 260; Aanestad, 390 F. Supp. 1165.
Lee, 669 F. Supp. at 981 (expressly rejecting Aanestad, 390 F. Supp. 1165).
203 770 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1985).
Alleged Food Poisoning Incident 770 F.2d at 5-6.
202 760 F. Supp. at 32.
208 Swaminathan, 962 F.2d at 389.
694
1994-1995] DESTINATION &JURISDICTION 695
supreme law of the land.2 °7 In construing the treaty, courts
must follow the plain language of the treaty unless it is am-
biguous. 20 8 Courts may only resort to the drafting history of
the Warsaw Convention when the language is ambiguous,
only contradicting the natural meaning by clear drafting
history. °9 In its jurisdictional provision, the Warsaw Con-
vention refers to destination in the singular.2 10 Therefore,
for any given transportation arrangement, there can be
only one destination. Numerous courts have held that, in
the instance of round trip travel, there .is only one destina-
tion-the place of origin as referenced on the ticket.2
1
'
In determining whether the Warsaw Convention applies
at all, the Convention itself clearly refers to the place of ori-
gin and place of destination as being determined by the
207 This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and a/l Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl. 2 (emphasis added). For cases specifically holding that the
Warsaw Convention is the supreme law of the land see Sulewski v. Federal Express
Corp., 933 F.2d 180,182 (2d Cir. 1991); O'Rourke v. Eastern Air Lines, 553 F. Supp.
226, 228 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); Karfunkel, 427 F. Supp. at 974; Sofranski v. KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines, 326 N.Y.S.2d 870, 871 (N.Y. City Civ. Ct. 1971); see also Bianchi v.
United Air Lines, 587 P.2d 632, 634 (Wash. App. 1978) (holding that the Warsaw
Convention preempts state law).
The constitutionality of the Warsaw Convention has also been addressed, specifi-
cally with reference to the jurisdictional provision contained in Article 28. In Lee v.
China Airlines, 669 F. Supp. 979 (C.D. Cal. 1987), the plaintiffs alleged that the
Warsaw Convention was unconstitutional, alleging three specific reasons. Id. at 982.
First, they argued the Warsaw Convention constituted a due process violation in that
it impaired their fundamental right to international travel. I& Second, they argued
an equal protection violation because the Warsaw Convention treats diverse passen-
gers differently depending solely on the contents of their tickets. Id. And, third,
they argued that the jurisdictional provision violated their due process rights in that
it prevented them from being able to have their tort claim heard in the United
States. Id. The court found that the Warsaw Convention was constitutional in these
respects, finding all three arguments to be without merit. IM at 982-85.
- Chan v. Korean Air Lines, 490 U.S. 122, 134 (1989).
'" In re Air Disaster Near Honolulu, Haw. on Feb. 24, 1989, 792 F. Supp. 1541,
1548 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Air Disaster Near Cove Neck, 774 F. Supp. at 728-29.
210 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 28(1).
211 See, e.g., Swaminathan, 962 F.2d at 389; Air Crash Near Cove Neck, 774 F. Supp. at
727; Alleged Food Poisoning Inciden4 770 F.2d at 6-7; Petrire 756 F.2d at 265-66; Lee v.
China Airlines, 669 F. Supp. at 981.
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contract made by the parties. 212 As in the case of the terms
of the convention, construction of the contract for carriage
is based on the plain language of the contract where it is
unambiguous, with the objective manifestation of intent of
the parties being the ticket.213 Numerous courts have deter-
mined applicability of the Warsaw Convention and, conse-
quently, destination based on the ticket itself, disregarding
any conceivable manifestations of the passenger's contrary
intent.2 14
If one considers the Warsaw Convention's language with
regards to destination, and contracts for carriage determin-
ing that destination, as ambiguous, the next step would be
to construe the convention to give effect to the shared in-
tentions of the High Contracting Parties who formulated it,
taking into account only legislative history that is clear.2 5
Some of the primary purposes of the Warsaw Convention
were to limit liability, limit the number of places in which
an action could be brought, and establish uniformity in the
rules dealing with international air travel.2 1 6
To be certain, allowing a passenger's subjective intent to
control the determination of destination would be a step
away from uniformity, since, as noted above, nearly all
courts take the other position. Moreover, it would contra-
vene the purpose of limiting the available places in which a
claim could be brought. The United States was not happy
with the provisions for jurisdiction contained in the Warsaw
Convention, and argued for jurisdiction based on the place
of accident 217 and nationality,218 neither of which appeared
in the final product. The discussion on the floor of the
212 Warsaw Convention, supra note 1, art. 1(2).
215 See supra notes 175-198 and accompanying text.
214 Id.
215 Air France v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 399 (1985); see also, supra notes 201-202 and
accompanying text.
216 See supra notes 31-52 and accompanying text.
217 G. Nathan Calkins, Jr., The Cause of Action Under the Warsaw Convention, Part L,
26J. AIR L. & CoM. 217, 229 (1959) (citing Warsaw Conference Documents).
218 G. Nathan Calkins, Jr., The Cause of Action Under the Warsaw Convention, Part l.,
26J. AIR L. & CoM. 323, 335 (1959).
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Warsaw Convention regarding the place of the accident re-
vealed these comments:
[T]he place of accident has absolutely no connection with
the contract or with the place to which the parties are con-
sidered to have given jurisdiction. Ordinary contract law as-
signs jurisdiction to the place where the contract was made,
but the place where the accident occurs may have absolutely
no relation to the contract.219
Shortly after this speech made by the British delegate, mak-
ing very clear the emphasis on the contract's relation to ju-
risdiction, the British proposal to eliminate the place of
accident provision in the jurisdiction clause was put to a
vote and approved.2 ° While a world in which everyone's
subjective manifestations of intent were given full effect
under the law would be wonderful indeed, doing so in the
context of determinations of destination for jurisdictional
purposes under the Warsaw Convention would be contrary
to the plain language of the Warsaw Convention itself and
the great weight of court decisions in the United States. Fi-
nally, evaluating passenger intent would be contrary to the
clear purpose of the Warsaw Convention to provide for uni-
formity, because evaluating intent would create uncertainty
and result in varying and unpredictable results in situations
involving questions of jurisdiction under the Warsaw Con-
vention based on destination.
29 Calkins, supra note 215, at 229 (quoting Mr. Clarke, delegate from Great
Britain).
- Id. at 230.
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